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Abstract
In 1933 Kolmogorov constructed a general theory that defines the modern concept of
conditional expectation. In 1955 Re´nyi fomulated a new axiomatic theory for probability
motivated by the need to include unbounded measures. We introduce a general concept of
conditional expectation in Re´nyi spaces. In this theory improper priors are allowed, and the
resulting posterior can also be improper.
In 1965 Lindley published his classic text on Bayesian statistics using the theory of
Re´nyi, but retracted this idea in 1973 due to the appearance of marginalization paradoxes
presented by Dawid, Stone, and Zidek. The paradoxes are investigated, and the seemingly
conflicting results are explained. The theory of Re´nyi can hence be used as an axiomatic
basis for statistics that allows use of unbounded priors.
Keywords: Haldane’s prior; Poisson intensity; Marginalization paradox; Mea-
sure theory; conditional probability space; axioms for statistics; conditioning on
a sigma field; improper prior
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1 Introduction
An often voiced criticism of the use of improper priors in Bayesian inference is that such priors
sometimes don’t lead to a proper posterior distribution. This can happen when the marginal prior
distribution of the data is not σ-finite (Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2010), as sometimes encountered
in applied settings with sparse data (e.g. Druilhet et al., 2016; Tufto et al., 2012, Appendix S4).
As a simple motivating example, suppose that we observe a homogeneous Poisson process,
and that we start with a non-informative scale prior pi(λ) = 1/λ on the Poisson intensity λ.
The distribution of the number X1 of events in the interval (0, t1] is then not σ-finite since
P (X1 = 0) =
∫∞
0
P (X1 = 0|λ)pi(λ) dλ is infinite. If we observe X1 = 0 and formally multiply
the prior by the likelihood we obtain an improper posterior pi(λ|X1 = 0) ∝ e−λt1/λ. This
distribution for λ is different from the initial prior, and we claim that this is a correct way of
incorporating the information given by X1 = 0.
A related example is the Beta posterior density for the success probability p given by pi(p |α) =
pα−1(1 − p)β−1 for a Bernoulli sequence with α successes out of α + β trials. This corresponds
to the Haldane (1932) improper prior pi(p) = p−1(1 − p)−1, and the posterior is improper if
α or β is zero. In all cases, however, the observation of the number of successes α results in
a corresponding updating of the uncertainty associated with p. This is given by the possibly
improper posterior.
Unfortunately, even people accepting the use of improper priors reject this form of inference,
on the ground that the posterior is not a probability distribution, and a mathematical theory
is lacking for this (Robert et al., 2009). This is understandable, and we agree initially with this
point of view. We will demonstrate, however, that the above forms of, so far, formal inference can
be made consistent with the axiomatic system of Re´nyi which allows improper laws. We propose
and claim that the mathematical theory developed in the following gives a rigorous foundation
for inference with unbounded laws.
The most familiar example of an unbounded law PΘ is the uniform law on the real line ΩΘ =
R. Following Renyi (1970) and Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2016) the uniform law is identified with
the countable collection of uniform laws PΘ(·|Bn) on each interval Bn = [−n, n]. This gives then
also the interpretation of PΘ: Given that Θ ∈ Bn the law is the uniform probability distribution
on Bn. The family B = {Bn |n ∈ N} is a bunch and the family {PΘ(· |B) |B ∈ B} defines a Re´nyi
space. The improper laws for the intensity λ and the success probability p in the initial examples
are interpreted similarly. The concept of a Re´nyi space and other elements from measure theory
are summarized in Appendix A.
The aim of this paper is to present a theory of statistics that allows improper laws both
as priors and posteriors. This extends the results of Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010, 2016),
and provides stronger links to the results on improper laws presented by Hartigan (1983) and
Bioche and Druilhet (2016). The main mathematical result is Theorem 1 which proves exis-
tence and uniqueness of conditional expectation on Re´nyi spaces. The existence and uniqueness
proof relies on the Radon-Nikodym theorem and a generalization of the Re´nyi structure theorem.
The theory of conditional expectation has been most important for the development of measure
theory, probability and statistics based on Kolmogorov’s concept of a probability space. The
generalization of this to the setting of Re´nyi spaces can hence be expected to be important for
future developments in mathematics and related fields.
Within this framework we reach the view that improper posteriors, just as improper priors, are
not ‘improper’ but may reflect complete or partial ignorance about a parameter after conditioning
on the data. Returning to the above Poisson-process example, at time t1, we have clearly learned
something about λ in that our belief in large values of the Poisson intensity λ has decreased while
our relative degree of belief in small values of λ has remained approximately unchanged. That
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the posterior is improper do not imply that our prior was wrong, but only that more data perhaps
needs to be collected if possible. Proceeding by using the improper posterior at time t1 as prior
in subsequent inference, say based on the number of occurrences observed in a sufficiently long
subsequent interval (t1, t2], we indeed eventually reach the same proper final posterior as the
one reached by combining the initial scale prior and the likelihood for the data on (0, t2]. We
hope that the reader can appreciate that this argument indicates also the potential philosophical
importance of unbounded laws more generally.
The most influential initial work on Bayesian inference is given by the book of Jeffreys (1939).
Parts of his arguments were mainly intuitive, and there is a lack of mathematical rigor as also
observed by Robert et al. (2009). The needed mathematical theory for a rigorous reformulation
of the original arguments of Jeffreys (1939) is presented next.
2 Existence and uniqueness conditional expectation
Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010, 2016) define the posterior law P(A |X = x) for the case where the
data X is σ-finite. The aim now is to prove existence and uniqueness of a posterior law without
assuming that X is σ-finite. It will be convenient to do this as an extension of conventional
measure theory, and then get the result for the posterior law as a special case. The reader
is advised to consult Appendix A for the definition of a Re´nyi space and other elements from
measure theory if needed.
Let (X,F) be a measurable space and let (T,G, ν) be a measure space (Rudin, 1987). Let a
measurable function T ∋ t 7→ µt(A) ∈ [0,∞] be given for each A ∈ F . We define µ to be a strong
random measure on F with respect to the law ν if the following holds for all disjoint measurable
A1, A2, . . .
1. µt(∅) = 0 for almost all t.
2. µt(A1 +A2 + · · · ) = µt(A1) + µt(A2) + · · · for almost all t.
The notation A+B denotes the union of two disjoint and measurable sets. Equality for almost
all t means that equality holds for all t in a set E where ν(Ec) = 0. All functions of t here and
in the following are assumed only to be defined almost everywhere, and the set E corresponding
to E ∋ t 7→ µt(Ak) depends on Ak.
If there exists B1, B2, . . . with X = ∪nBn and 0 < µt(Bn) <∞, then µ is said to be σ-finite.
If, additionally, µt is a measure on F for all t, then µ is a random measure. In this paper we
define the space X to be regular if every σ-finite strong random measure can be represented by
a random measure. The Borel σ-algebra of a complete separable metric space X gives a regular
space.
The concept of a strong random measure is here introduced similarly to how Skorohod (1984,
p.1-2) introduces the concept of a strong random operator. He also defines the notion of a weak
random operator by duality, but this is equivalent with strong when the image space is the
complex numbers. It should be noted that the naming convention here is counter intuitive in the
sense that a strong random operator is a weaker concept than a random operator, but there are
good reasons for adopting the conventions of Skorohod.
Let µ be a measure on X and let T : X→T be measurable. We define a strong random
measure µt(A) to be the conditional law of µ given T = t if
µ(A[T ∈ C] |B) =
∫
C
µt(A |B)µT (dt |B) (1)
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for all measurable A,C and all B with 0 < µ(B) < ∞, where µt(A |B) = µt(AB)/µt(B),
µT (D |B) = µ(T ∈ D |B), and µ(F |B) = µ(FB) (no normalization here!). The notation
(T ∈ D) = {x |T (x) ∈ D} = T−1(D) is similar to the notation {T (x) ∈ D} used by Doob (1953,
p.1). For a conditional law we use the notation µt(A) = µ(A |T = t). The double use of the
symbol µ in the above is justified by:
Theorem 1. A unique σ-finite conditional law µ(A |T = t) exists if µ is a σ-finite measure on
X and T : X→T is measurable.
Proof. If t 7→ c(t) > 0 is measurable, then µt(AB)/µt(B) = c(t)µt(AB)/[c(t)µt(B)] shows that
uniqueness up to multiplication by a positive function is the best possible uniqueness. The
measure C 7→ µ(AB[T ∈ C]) is dominated by the σ-finite measure C 7→ µ([T ∈ C]B), so
a unique normalized strongly random µt(A |B) follows from the Radon-Nikodym theorem. It
remains to prove that µt(A |B) = µt(AB)/µt(B) for a σ-finite strong random measure µt.
Let B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · with 0 < µ(Bn) < ∞ and ∪nBn = X, and define µt(Bn) = µt(Bn |B1 ∪
Bn)/µ
t(B1 |B1 ∪ Bn). It follows that µt(Bn) = 1/µt(B1 |Bn) and µt(B1) = 1. For A ⊂ Bn
put µt(A) = µt(A |Bn)µ
t(Bn) and define µ
t(A) = µt(A ∩ B1) +
∑
n≥2 µ
t(A ∩ Bn ∩ B
c
n−1) for a
general A ∈ F .
It must be proved that the above construction is well defined. Let A ⊂ Bn ⊂ Bm. It must be
proved that (*) µt(A |Bn)µt(Bn) = µt(A |Bm)µt(Bm). Observe first that µ(BnBm[T ∈ D]) =∫
D
µt(Bn |Bm)µT (dt |Bm) =
∫
D
µT (dt |Bn) gives µT (dt |Bn) = µt(Bn |Bm)µT (dt |Bm). The
(*) claim follows from
µ(A(T ∈ D)) =
∫
D
µt(A |Bn)µ
t(Bn |Bm)µT (dt |Bm) =
∫
D
µt(A |Bm)µT (dt |Bm) (2)
since µt(Bn |Bm) = µ
t(Bn)/µ
t(Bm) = µ
t(B1 |Bm)/µ
t(B1 |Bn) follows from the case A = B1 in
equation (2). This defines a unique µt(A). The remaining claims follow by verification and is
left to the reader.
All of the previous can be repeated with a replacement of the measurable set A with a positive
measurable function A : X→ [0,∞] and conditional expectation of complex valued functions can
be defined by decomposition in positive and negative parts and then in real and complex parts.
Consideration of the dual space gives conditional expectation of a separable Banach space valued
A : X→B. The conditional expectation E(A |T = t) is in particular well defined when A is a
separable Hilbert space valued. Separability is assumed to ensure almost everywhere definition
on T.
An alternative approach, as noted by Kolmogorov (1933, p.54, eq.10), is to define the condi-
tional expectation by integration with respect to the conditional probability. For B equal to the
set of real numbers R or the set of complex numbers C the alternative approach gives the same
strong random linear functional, but for more general B there are many alternative routes with
different results.
Conditional expectation µ(A | T ) with respect to a σ-field T ⊂ F is defined by T (x) = x
and (T,G) = (X, T ). It can be noted that we define µt(A) directly instead of more indirectly
by first defining µ(A | T ) as is more common. This has the advantage of allowing a completely
general measurable space T, whereas the common approach requires separability properties of
X according to Schervish (1995, p.616, Prop.B.24).
It can finally be observed that the proof of Theorem 1 contains a proof of a structure theorem
for strong random Re´nyi spaces defined by a consistent family of strong random conditional
probabilities µt(A |B) for B ∈ B for a fixed bunch B ⊂ F : The family is generated by a strong
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random measure µt(A) such that µt(A |B) = µt(AB)/µt(B). The consistency requirement is
that B1 ⊂ B2 implies µ
t(B1 |B2) > 0 and
µt(A |B1) =
µt(AB1 |B2)
µt(B1 |B2)
(3)
3 Examples
3.1 Mathematical statistics
A statistical model is given by the structure
ΩΘ ΩΓ
(Ω, E ,P)
ΩX ΩY
ψ
Θ
YX
Γ
φ
(4)
In conventional theory (Schervish, 1995) the space Ω is a probability space. In the more general
setting of a Re´nyi space Ω considered here the underlying law P is a conditional probability law
with a corresponding bunch B ⊂ E . The law of the data X given the parameter Θ = θ is defined
by PθX(A) = P(X ∈ A |Θ = θ). The law of the model parameter Θ given the data X = x is
defined by PxΘ(A) = P(Θ ∈ A |X = x). The posterior law P
x
Γ of a parameter γ = ψ(θ) and the
law PθY of a statistic are determined by this and equation (4).
In previous work by Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010, 2016); Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2017)
it was required that the data X is σ-finite, but Theorem 1 shows that this requirement is not
needed. There is, however, a prize: The posterior must in general be interpreted as an improper
law. The initial examples demonstrate, however, that even if the data X is not σ-finite, it may
happen that the posterior is a proper distribution for some values of x. Assuming that X is
σ-finite ensures that the posterior is always proper.
A similar comment holds for the law PθX of the data X . The factorization PX,Θ(dx, dθ) =
PX(dx |Θ = θ) PΘ(dθ) holds uniquely if and only if Θ is σ-finite. In this case, a σ-finite Θ is
required if the most common Bayesian recipe is to be used:
1. Specify a statistical model law PθX
2. Specify a prior PΘ
3. Compute the posterior PxΘ
If Θ is not σ-finite, the first two steps must be replaced by a direct specification of a joint σ-finite
law PX,Θ, and Theorem 1 ensures then that the posterior P
x
Θ is uniquely defined.
3.2 Densities
Assume that (X,Θ) ∼ f(x, θ)µ(dx)ν(dθ). It follows that (X |Θ = θ) ∼ f(x, θ)µ(dx), and that
(Θ |X = x) ∼ f(x, θ)ν(dθ). This can be verified directly by the defining equation (1). It
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follows in particular that this is consistent with the definition of an improper posterior used
by Bioche and Druilhet (2016, p.1716). The previous can also be reformulated as f(x | θ) =
f(x, θ) = f(θ |x): There is no need for a normalization constant since two proportional densities
are equivalent!
Let c(θ) > 0 be an otherwise arbitrary measurable function. It follows then that (X |Θ =
θ) ∼ c(θ)f(x, θ)µ(dx) when interpreted as a strong random conditional law. A formal prior
density pi gives the joint density c(θ)f(x, θ)pi(θ), and this shows that the interpretation of pi
as prior information is dubious in this case as pointed out by Lavine and Hodges (2012) and
Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2017) using a model with intrinsic conditional auto-regressions. It is
the resulting joint distribution and the conditional laws that can be interpreted. The usual
decomposition in a prior and a model can only be interpreted uniquely if the prior for the model
parameter Θ is σ-finite. Conversely, Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2017) obtain a posterior only in
the case where the data X is σ-finite, but Theorem 1 ensures that a posterior is defined also
without requiring a σ-finite X .
A concrete simple example is given by letting PX,Θ correspond to Lebesgue measure in the
plane. The law of X given Θ = θ and the posterior law of Θ given X = x correspond then both
to Lebesgue measure on the line. The factorization f(x, θ) = 1 = c(θ)pi(θ) with pi(θ) = 1/c(θ) is
completely arbitrary. This can be interpreted according to Hartigan (1983, p.26) as saying that
the marginal distribution pi is not determined by the joint distribution. This interpretation is
discussed in more detail by Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010), but it differs from the interpretation
here. The marginal law of Θ is unique, but given by the non-σ-finite measure PΘ(dθ) =∞ · dθ.
It follows in particular that the decomposition PX,Θ(dx, dθ) = P
θ
X(dx) PΘ(dθ) fails in this case.
Let µ(dx, dy) be Lebesgue measure in the plane, and consider the indicator function of the
upper half plane: T (x, y) = [y > 0]. It follows that µT (dt) = [∞δ0(t) +∞δ1(t)]dt so T is not
σ-finite. The conditional law µt(dx, dy) = [(t = 1)(y > 0) + (t = 0)(y ≤ 0)]dxdy is, however,
well defined. The conditional law µ1 is Lebesgue measure restricted to the upper half-plane and
µ0 is Lebesgue measure restricted to the lower half plane. This demonstrates directly that the
conditional law is also defined when T is not σ-finite.
Consider more generally a function T : X→ N. This gives µt(A) = µ(A(T = t)) and then
also the elementary definition of the law µ(A |B) = µ(AB) for any B with µ(B) > 0. This
is consistent with the familiar µ(A |B) = µ(AB)/µ(B) for the case where µ(B) < ∞. A law
is arbitrary up to multiplication by a positive constant: It is an equivalence class of σ-finite
measures. Theorem 1 gives the existence of conditional expectations in full generality - including
this elementary case.
3.3 The marginalization paradox
Stone and Dawid (1972, p.370) consider inference for the ratio θ of two exponential means.
They assume that X and Y are independent exponentially distributed with hazard rates θφ and
φ respectively. It is then clear that Z = Y/X will have a distribution that only depends on θ. In
fact, Z = θF , where F has a Fisher distribution with 2 and 2 degrees of freedom since a standard
exponential variable is distributed like a χ22/2 variable. It follows then that the density is
f(z | θ) = θ−1(1 + z/θ)−2 = θ(θ + z)−2 (5)
The posterior density corresponding to a prior density pi(θ) is then
pi(θ | z) ∝
θpi(θ)
(θ + z)2
(6)
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A different argument goes as follows. The joint density with a joint prior pi(θ)dθdφ gives
pi(θ, φ | x, y) ∝ pi(θ)θφ2 exp(−φ(θx + y)) The marginal posterior of θ follows by integration over
φ which gives
pi(θ |x, y) ∝
θpi(θ)
(θx+ y)3
∝
θpi(θ)
(θ + z)3
(7)
Equation (7) gives a posterior given the data (x, y) that differs from the posterior found in equa-
tion (6). This constitutes the argument and paradox presented originally by Stone and Dawid
(1972, p.370).
A range of similar paradoxes were presented later by Dawid et al. (1973) with discussion of
links to fiducial inference. They claim that the Fraser (1968) theory of structural inference is
intrinsically paradoxical under marginalization. Furthermore, Lindley, in his discussion of the
paper (Dawid et al., 1973, p.218) writes:
The paradoxes displayed here are too serious to be ignored and impropriety must go.
Let me personally retract the ideas contained in my own book.
This is of particular relevance here since in 1964, in his book, Lindley (1980, p.xi) wrote:
The axiomatic structure used here is not the usual one associated with the name of
Kolmogorov. Instead one based on the ideas of Re´nyi has been used.
We argue here and in the following that Lindley’s initial intuition was correct: The theory of
Re´nyi gives a mathematical foundation for statistics that allows unbounded measures.
3.4 Resolving the paradox
We disagree with the criticism of Fraser’s structural inference, but more importantly we will
next explain that there is no paradox related to the above problem when it is treated within
the theory of Re´nyi. This has already been indicated by Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010), and is
discussed in more detail by Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2017). Lindqvist and Taraldsen (2017) rely
on a theory where it is only allowed to condition on σ-finite statistics. We extend this argument
now with reference to Theorem 1 which allows conditioning on any statistic.
The initial assumptions are interpreted to imply a joint distribution given by the density:
f(x, z, θ, φ) = pi(θ)θφ2xe−φx(θ+z) (8)
Taraldsen and Lindqvist (2010) explain that any marginal is determined by a joint density and
integration over φ gives then
f(x, z, θ) = pi(θ)θx−2(θ + z)−3 (9)
which implies
f(θ |x, z) = pi(θ)θx−2(θ + z)−3 = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−3 (10)
The second equality holds since it is equality in the sense given by an equivalence class as in
Theorem 1. The right hand side can be multiplied by an arbitrary positive function c(x, z)
without changing the equality sign. Equation (10) is equivalent with equation (7) since there is
a one-one correspondence between (x, y) and (x, z).
An alternative is to integrate over x to obtain
f(z, θ, φ) = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−2 (11)
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which implies
f(θ | z, φ) = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−2 (12)
This is similar to equation (6), but it is different since equation (6) only condition on z. Equa-
tion (12) is not in conflict with equation (10) for the same reason.
Starting with either equation (9) or equation (11) gives
f(z, θ) =∞ · pi(θ) (13)
which shows that neither Z |Θ = θ nor Θ |Z = z can be represented by a σ-finite measure.
This implies that the argument in equations (5-6) is wrong given equation (8). Equation (7), or
equivalently equation (10), gives the correct posterior distribution for Θ.
If, instead, the prior pi(θ)φ−1dθdφ is used, then the result will be
f(θ | z, φ) = φ−1pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−2 = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−2 (14)
and
f(θ |x, z) = pi(θ)θx(x(θ + z))−2 = pi(θ)θ(θ + z)−2 (15)
The conditionals coincide, but it is still true that neither equals the law of Θ |Z = z since the
law of (Θ, Z) still fails to be σ-finite.
If, however, equation (5) together with a prior pi(θ) is taken as the initial σ-finite law for
(Θ, Z), then equation (6) is the correct posterior. The paradox is then removed since the con-
flicting conclusions are consequences of different initial assumptions.
It can finally be noted that even if a conditional law Px,z does not depend on x it can not
be concluded that it equals Pz. This is demonstrated by equation (10) and equation (12). This
rule holds for probability distributions, and also more generally if Z and (X,Z) are σ-finite.
Stone and Dawid (1972) calculated formally as explained above as if the rule where generally
valid. This error resulted in two conflicting results.
4 Final remarks
It follows from the previous quotations of Lindley that he initially supported the use of conditional
probability spaces as introduced by Re´nyi. We have argued that this initial suggestion is indeed
a natural approach to Bayesian statistics including commonly used objective priors.
As explained, the marginalization paradoxes seem to have been the main reason for Lindley’s
change in opinion on this. Tony O’Hagan interviewed Lindley for the Royal Statistical Society’s
Bayes 250 Conference held in June 2013. Lindley explains very nicely that all probabilities are
conditional probabilities, but also recalls his reaction to the marginalization paradoxes:
Good heavens, the world is collapsing about me.
Lindley continuous to argue that Bayesian statistics without improper priors is a sound
theory, and that the focus should be on how to quantify the prior uncertainty of the unknown
parameters. The parameters should be viewed as real physical quantities regardless of which
experiment is later used for decreasing their uncertainty. This clearly disqualifies the choice of
data dependent priors, and even the choice of priors depending on the particular statistical model
used. We wholeheartedly agree with Lindley on this, but we claim that this can be done also
within the more general theory introduced by Re´nyi and continued here.
An unbounded law can according to Re´nyi be interpreted by the corresponding family of
conditional probabilities given by conditioning on the events in the bunch. These elementary
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conditional probabilities are probabilities in the sense of Kolmogorov, and the interpretation
depends on the application. They can, as Lindley advocates convincingly, be interpreted as
personal probabilities corresponding to a range of real life events. They can also, as needed in
for instance quantum physics, be interpreted as as objectively true probabilities representing a
law for how a system behaves when observed repeatedly under idealized conditions.
Assume now that we accept a theory where the prior uncertainty is given by a possibly
unbounded law. It is then natural to accept that a resulting posterior uncertainty can also be
represented by a possibly unbounded law. Both the prior and the posterior represent uncertainty
of the same kind. Hopefully, many can agree on this on an intuitive level. The main result
presented here is Theorem 1 which provides a mathematical theory in which this can be done
consistently without paradoxical results.
A Appendix on measure theory
A.1 Measurable space and measure
A measurable space is a set X equipped with a σ-field F of subsets of X. A σ-field F is a
collection of subsets of a fixed set that contains the empty set ∅ and is closed under complements
and countable unions. A set A ⊂ X is measurable if A ∈ F . A measure µ is a function
µ : F → [0,∞] with µ(∅) = 0 that is countably additive: µ(A1+A2+ · · · ) = µ(A1)+µ(A2)+ · · · .
A probability measure is a measure µ on a measurable space X with µ(X) = 1. A measure space
is a measurable space X equiped with a measure (Rudin, 1987, p.16). A probability space is a
measurable space X equipped with a probability measure.
A sigma-field F0 ⊂ F of a measure space (X,F , µ) is sigma-finite if there exist measurable
sets F1, F2, . . . ∈ F0 with µ(Fi) < ∞ and X = F1 ∪ F2 ∪ · · · (Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2016,
p.5010). A measure space (X,F , µ) is sigma-finite if F is sigma-finite, and µ is then also said to
be sigma-finite (Rudin, 1987, p.121).
A.2 Conditional probability space
A bunch B in a measurable space is a family of measurable sets closed under finite unions that
does not contain the empty set, but contains a countable family F1, F2, . . . of sets whos union is
the whole set. A bunch B is ordered if B1, B2 ∈ B implies B1 ⊂ B2 or B2 ⊂ B1.
A Re´nyi space (Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2016, p.5013) is a measurable spaceX equipped with
a family {ν(· |B) |B ∈ B} of probability measures indexed by a bunch B which fulfill B1, B2 ∈ B
and B1 ⊂ B2 ⇒ ν(B1 |B2) > 0, and the identity
ν(A |B1) =
ν(A ∩B1 |B2)
ν(B1 |B2)
(16)
A sigma-finite measure µ on a measurable space X generates a probability law ν = [µ] =
{cµ | c ∈ R+} with corresponding conditional probabilities ν(A |B) = µ(A ∩ B)/µ(B) for B ∈
cB = {B | 0 < µ(B) <∞}. The Re´nyi space generated by the probability law ν is given by the
family {ν(· |B) |B ∈ B}. A conditional probability space is a set X equipped with a probability
law.
A.3 Statistical model
A statistical model is a triple (Ω, X,Θ) where the space Ω is a conditional probability space,
the data X is a measurable function X : Ω→ ΩX , and the model parameter Θ is a measurable
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function Θ : Ω→ΩΘ. These definitions, and the ones that follow, are as given by Schervish (1995)
except for choice of symbols and the generalization given by assuming that Ω is a conditional
probability space. There is one probability law P defined on the sigma-algebra E of events in
Ω - and all other concepts are defined from the basic space Ω (Taraldsen and Lindqvist, 2016,
p.5011).
A statistic Y = φ(X) = φ ◦ X is a measurable function of the data and a parameter Γ =
ψ(Θ) = ψ ◦Θ is a measurable function of the model parameter as illustrated in equation (17)
ΩΘ ΩΓ
(Ω, E ,P)
ΩX ΩY
ψ
Θ
YX
Γ
φ
(17)
A random quantity is a measurable function Z : Ω→ ΩZ , and its law is defined by PZ(A) =
P(Z ∈ A) where (Z ∈ A) = {ω |Z(ω) ∈ A}. We abuse notation here and interpret P as one
fixed representative of the equivalence class that defines P as a conditional measure. A random
quantity is sigma-finite if its law is sigma-finite. If the model parameter Θ is sigma-finte, then
the conditional probabilities PθX(A) = P(X ∈ A |Θ = θ) define a family of probability measures
on the sample space ΩX indexed by the model parameter θ in the model parameter space ΩΘ.
Likewise, if the data X is sigma-finite, then the posterior PxΘ(B) = P(Θ ∈ B |X = x) is a
probability measure on the model parameter space ΩΘ. The mappings θ 7→ P
θ
X(A) and x 7→
PxΘ(B) are measurable for all eventsA, but existence of families of probability measures as claimed
above requires regularity assumptions: It is sufficient to assume that the sample space ΩX and the
model parameter space ΩΘ are Borel spaces (Schervish, 1995, p.619)(Taraldsen and Lindqvist,
2016, p.5011).
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